A cognitive hierarchy model of games

Colin F. Camerer*, Teck Hua Ho, Juin Kuan Chong

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

978 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Players in a game are "in equilibrium" if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is "cognitive hierarchy" (CH) theory, where each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k - 1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5 steps fits data from many games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)861-898
Number of pages38
JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
Volume119
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2004
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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