A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games

Juin Kuan Chong*, Teck Hua Ho, Colin Camerer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

40 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Subjects in simple games frequently exhibit non-equilibrium behaviors. Cognitive hierarchy (CH) and level k (LK) are two prevailing structural models that capture such behaviors well. This paper proposes a generalized CH (GCH) model that nests a variant of the LK model, called LM. GCH differs from CH in two ways. First, each lower level's actual frequency is exponentially weighted with α to form level-k's belief on relative proportions; α captures stereotype bias. CH assumes no stereotype bias (α=1) and LM assumes extreme bias (α=∞). Second, GCH replaces random choice with minimum aversion for level 0. Level 0s are more likely to choose strategies that never yield the minimum payoff for any of the opponent's strategies. GCH captures behaviors better than CH and LK in fifty-five n×m games from four datasets. Robustness tests using three new games further validate GCHs descriptive strength over CH and LK.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257-274
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume99
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 1 2016
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier Inc.

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Behavioral game theory
  • Cognitive hierarchy
  • Generalized cognitive hierarchy
  • Level-k model
  • Level-m model
  • Non-equilibrium structural models

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