A psychological approach to strategic thinking in games

Colin F. Camerer*, Teck Hua Ho, Juin Kuan Chong

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Psychologists have avoided using game theory because of its unrealistic assumptions on human cognitive ability, such as perfectly accurate forecasting, and its large reliance on equilibrium analysis to predict behavior in social interactions. Recent developments in behavioral game theory address these limitations by allowing for bounded and heterogeneous thinking, recognizing limitations on people's forecasting abilities, while keeping models as generally applicable as those using equilibrium analysis. One such psychological approach is cognitive hierarchy (CH) modeling, in which players reason accurately only about those who think less. CH predicts non-equilibrium behaviors that have been observed in more than 100 laboratory experiments and several field settings, and has process implications that have been tested with eye-tracking and data from brain imaging.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)157-162
Number of pages6
JournalCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences
Volume3
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Cognitive Neuroscience
  • Psychiatry and Mental health
  • Behavioral Neuroscience

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