Costly Information Acquisition, Social Networks, and Asset Prices: Experimental Evidence

Edward Halim, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We design an experiment to study the implications of information networks for incentives to acquire costly information, market liquidity, investors' earnings, and asset price characteristics in a financial market. Social communication crowds out information production as a result of an agent's temptation to free ride on the signals purchased by her neighbors. Although information exchange among traders increases trading volume, improves liquidity, and enhances the ability of asset prices to reflect the available information in the market, it fails to improve price informativeness. Net earnings and social welfare are higher with information sharing due to reduced acquisition of costly signals.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1975-2010
Number of pages36
JournalJournal of Finance
Volume74
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2019
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 the American Finance Association

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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