Abstract
This article examines the governance of dual-use research of concern (DURC) in Southeast Asia, highlighting both progress and persistent gaps in biosafety and biosecurity. While significant developments have been made in biosafety and biosecurity, the region remains underprepared to address the complexities of DURC. This underpreparedness stems from diverse factors, including varying levels of exposure to biosecurity threats across countries, competing priorities within national biosecurity agendas, limited awareness of DURC issues, and weak institutional capacity to implement effective oversight mechanisms. These factors create inconsistencies in the implementation of DURC governance across countries, undermining efforts to establish robust safeguards against potential misuse of scientific research. The article argues that addressing these domestic issues is crucial for building more effective DURC governance frameworks. Strengthening national policies, improving institutional capabilities, and fostering awareness of DURC risks are essential steps toward mitigating biosecurity threats and ensuring the responsible conduct of research within the region.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Journal | Applied Biosafety |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Accepted/In press - 2025 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright 2025, ABSA International 2025.
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Biotechnology
- Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
- Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
- Health, Toxicology and Mutagenesis
Keywords
- biological risk
- biosecurity
- biosecurity governance
- dual-use research of concern
- Southeast Asia