Abstract
We experimentally investigate group effort-coordination games where individuals are occasionally offered opportunities to alter their interaction neighborhood (with whom they want to connect and interact). We vary the neighborhood flexibility, or the rate with which such opportunities arise. We find that increasing neighborhood flexibility significantly improves coordination efficiency when players start with a decentralized circle-shaped network, but the improvement is limited if they start with a highly centralized star-shaped network. Neighborhood flexibility improves coordination through facilitating assortative matching among high-effort players. In star-shaped networks, neighborhood flexibility has a side-effect of decentralizing the networks which weakens the central player's ability in facilitating coordination hence partially offsets the benefit from assortative matching.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 103521 |
Journal | European Economic Review |
Volume | 129 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2020 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2020 The Authors
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Average effort
- Centralization
- Efficient coordination
- Neighborhood choice
- Social network