Highly flexible neighborhood promotes efficient coordination: Experimental evidence

Yohanes E. Riyanto, Tat How Teh*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We experimentally investigate group effort-coordination games where individuals are occasionally offered opportunities to alter their interaction neighborhood (with whom they want to connect and interact). We vary the neighborhood flexibility, or the rate with which such opportunities arise. We find that increasing neighborhood flexibility significantly improves coordination efficiency when players start with a decentralized circle-shaped network, but the improvement is limited if they start with a highly centralized star-shaped network. Neighborhood flexibility improves coordination through facilitating assortative matching among high-effort players. In star-shaped networks, neighborhood flexibility has a side-effect of decentralizing the networks which weakens the central player's ability in facilitating coordination hence partially offsets the benefit from assortative matching.

Original languageEnglish
Article number103521
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume129
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2020
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Authors

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Average effort
  • Centralization
  • Efficient coordination
  • Neighborhood choice
  • Social network

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