It pays to have friends

Byoung Hyoun Hwang, Seoyoung Kim*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

541 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Currently, a director is classified as independent if he or she has neither financial nor familial ties to the CEO or to the firm. We add another dimension: social ties. Using a unique data set, we find that 87% of boards are conventionally independent but that only 62% are conventionally and socially independent. Furthermore, firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation, exhibit stronger pay-performance sensitivity, and exhibit stronger turnover-performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent. Our results suggest that social ties do matter and that, consequently, a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)138-158
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume93
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2009
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

Keywords

  • Board independence
  • Executive compensation
  • Social ties

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