Abstract
Currently, a director is classified as independent if he or she has neither financial nor familial ties to the CEO or to the firm. We add another dimension: social ties. Using a unique data set, we find that 87% of boards are conventionally independent but that only 62% are conventionally and socially independent. Furthermore, firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation, exhibit stronger pay-performance sensitivity, and exhibit stronger turnover-performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent. Our results suggest that social ties do matter and that, consequently, a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 138-158 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
Volume | 93 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
Keywords
- Board independence
- Executive compensation
- Social ties