Abstract
In a field experiment at Google Answers, we investigate the performance of price-based online knowledge markets by systematically manipulating prices. Specifically, we study the effects of price, tip, and a reputation system on both an answerer's effort and answer quality by posting real reference questions from the Internet Public Library on Google Answers under different pricing schemes. We find that a higher price leads to a significantly longer, but not better, answer, while an answerer with a higher reputation provides significantly better answers. Our results highlight the limitation of monetary incentives and the importance of reputation systems in knowledge market design.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 641-664 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Aug 2010 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics