Knowledge Market Design: A Field Experiment at Google Answers

Yan Chen*, Teck Hua Ho, YONG MI Kim

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

92 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a field experiment at Google Answers, we investigate the performance of price-based online knowledge markets by systematically manipulating prices. Specifically, we study the effects of price, tip, and a reputation system on both an answerer's effort and answer quality by posting real reference questions from the Internet Public Library on Google Answers under different pricing schemes. We find that a higher price leads to a significantly longer, but not better, answer, while an answerer with a higher reputation provides significantly better answers. Our results highlight the limitation of monetary incentives and the importance of reputation systems in knowledge market design.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)641-664
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume12
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2010
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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