Abstract
Under the reserve-clause system that assigns the property-rights on the Major League Baseball players' services to teams, player transfers are negotiated between teams without the involvement of players. In contrast, under the current free-agency system, players with free-agent status negotiate directly with potential suitors. Thus, the system assigns the property-rights to players. Using data extracted from the Baseball Archive (http://baseball1.com), this article examines the effect of the change in the property-rights assignment on the allocation of talents across teams. We find that the change increased large-market teams' shares of veteran all-star players and the concentration of senior players.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 3425-3436 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Applied Economics |
Volume | 41 |
Issue number | 26 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Economics and Econometrics