Abstract
Cooperation can take several forms when a group of people interact repeatedly over time. Turn-taking is one such form of intertemporal cooperation that is observed in various daily activities, but at the same time, remains under-studied in the economics literature. We report results from experiments designed to investigate the path of intertemporal cooperation in three-person finitely repeated public good games without communication. Each round, only a subset of individuals is needed to contribute in order to generate a public benefit to all group members. Incidence of perfect turn-taking is limited to settings where the costs are homogeneous. When the perfect turn-taking path is at odds with efficiency, players seldom engage in taking turns. Private information about costs changes the timing of individual decisions within each round. A timed contribution protocol limits the frequency of miscoordinated outcomes every round.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 21-36 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 165 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Keywords
- Experiment
- Intertemporal cooperation
- Public good provision
- Timed contribution
- Turn-taking